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Introduction
From the Ogoni people devastated by oil drilling in Nigeria to the Inuit and
other indigenous populations threatened by climate change, communities
disparately burdened by environmental degradation are increasingly framing
their demands for environmental justice in the language of human rights.
Domestic and international tribunals have concluded that failure to protect the
environment may violate a variety of human rights (including the rights to life,
health, property, and privacy; the collective rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands and resources; and the right to a healthy environment).
While the advantages and disadvantages of human rights-based approaches
to environmental protection continue to be debated in the scholarly literature,1
there is a dearth of research regarding the impact on North-South power
relations of the evolving environmental human rights regime.2 Some scholars
have questioned the utility of the human rights framework given the
“diminished governance capacity of Third World states, which is the result of
years of intervention by international law and international financial
institutions.”3 They remind us that the lending practices of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as well as international trade and
investment agreements have impaired the ability of Southern states to comply
with human rights norms.4 Other scholars have expressed doubts about the
ability of human rights law to adequately articulate and advance the aspirations
and resistance strategies of diverse grassroots social justice movements, and
1.

2.

3.
4.
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See, e.g., Rebecca Bratspies, Do We Need a Human Right to a Healthy Environment?, 13 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 31 (2015); Justice Susan Glazebrook, Human Rights and the Environment, 40
VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 293 (2009); Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A
Reassessment, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 471 (2007); Michael Burger, Bi-Polar and Polycentric
Approaches to Human Rights and the Environment, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 371 (2003).
This article uses the terms North and South to distinguish wealthy industrialized nations
(including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the members of the
European Union) from the generally less prosperous nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The global South shares a history of Northern economic and political domination that prompted
Southern nations to join forces as a negotiating bloc (the Groups of 77 plus China) to demand
greater equity in international trade law and international environmental law. The article
recognizes the heterogeneity of the countries that comprise the global South; the existence of an
elite economic and political class in the South (the North in the South), as well as socially and
economically subordinated communities in the North (the South in the North); and the growing
South-South economic and environmental conflicts, including disagreements over climate policy
and over foreign acquisition of Southern agricultural lands (the so-called “land grabs”).
Nevertheless, the North-South framework remains a useful tool for mobilizing collective
resistance to an international economic order that perpetuates poverty, inequality, and
widespread environmental degradation.
Penelope Simons, International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability
for Violations of Human Rights, 3 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 5, 40 (2012).
Id. at 19-29, 40.
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have warned about the susceptibility of the human rights discourse to
cooptation by powerful states to advance their own economic and political
interests.5 This article attempts to fill the gap in the scholarly literature by
examining the promise and the peril of environmental human rights as a means
of challenging environmental injustice within nations as well as the NorthSouth dimension of environmental injustice.6
The article is divided into four parts. Part I defines the term environmental
justice, explains its application to environmental inequities within and between
nations, and discusses the evolution of environmental human rights. Part II
examines the economic roots of environmental injustice from the colonial period
to the present. Part III analyzes the role of international law in justifying the
conquest of nature and the subordination of non-European peoples. Part IV
identifies the limitations of environmental human rights as a means of
combating environmental injustice, and proposes ways of remedying these
defects. The article concludes that there is a tension between human rights
discourse as an instrument of grassroots resistance and its appropriation by
Northern states to reinforce North-South economic and political dominance.
When human rights are incorporated into international legal instruments and
institutions, they become embedded in structures that may constrain their
transformative potential and reproduce North-South power imbalances.
Scholars and practitioners should be mindful of these tensions in order to
maximize the emancipatory potential of environmental human rights and to
advocate effectively on behalf of disparately burdened nations and communities.

5.

6.

See generally Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Re-thinking
Human Rights and Development as a Third World Strategy, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 767 (2006)
[hereinafter Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law]; Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Culture,
Resistance, and the Problems of Translating Human Rights, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 419 (2006)
[hereinafter Rajagopal, Translating Human Rights].
For an introduction to the North-South dimension of environmental justice and its implications
for international environmental law, international economic law, and international human rights
law, see Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental Justice and International Environmental Law, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 77, 78 (Shawkat Alam et al.
eds., 2012) [hereinafter Gonzalez, Environmental Justice]. In examining the utility of
environmental human rights as a means of resisting environmental injustice, this article owes an
immense debt to the critiques of international law articulated by scholars associated with the
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement. See generally Antony Anghie,
What is TWAIL: Comment, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 39 (2000); James Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief
History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV.
26 (2011); Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 31 (2000); Obiora C.
Okafor, Critical Third World Approaches to International Law: Theory, Methodology, or Both?, 10
INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 371 (2008).
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I. Environmental Justice and the North-South Divide
Global economic activity exerts relentless pressure on the planet’s ecological
systems and threatens the health and well-being of present and future
generations.
Despite the proliferation of legal instruments to combat
environmental degradation, the global economy continues to exploit natural
resources at unsustainable rates while intensifying inequality within and
among nations.7
The leading cause of global environmental degradation is the profligate
consumption of the planet’s resources by its wealthiest inhabitants, most of who
reside in the global North or in the mega-cities of the global South.8 The richest
twenty percent of the world’s population consumes roughly eighty percent of the
planet’s economic output,9 and generates ninety percent of its hazardous
waste.10 From colonialism to the present, the North’s appropriation of the
South’s natural resources in order to fuel its economic expansion has generated
harmful economic and environmental consequences, trapping Southern nations
in vicious cycles of poverty and environmental degradation, and producing
global environmental problems (such as climate change and biodiversity loss)
that will constrain the development options of generations to come.11 Indeed,
much of the ecological harm in the global South is due to export-oriented
production rather than domestic consumption and to unsustainable natural
resource exploitation by transnational corporations.12
The adverse impacts of global environmental degradation are borne
disproportionately by the planet’s most vulnerable human beings, including the
rural and urban poor, racial and ethnic minorities, women, and indigenous

7.

8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
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Rep. of the U.N. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being:
Synthesis, 1-24 (2005), available at http://www.unep.org/maweb/documents/document.356.
aspx.pdf; see also U. N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Trade and Development Report 2012, 31,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/2012 (2012) (observing that "economic inequality has re-emerged as a
central policy concern due to rising global inequality over the course of the past three decades).
See U.N. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 7, at 1-24.
See William E. Rees & Laura Westra, When Consumption Does Violence: Can There be
Sustainability and Environmental Justice in a Resource-Limited World?, in JUST
SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 99, 110-12 (Julian Agyeman et al. eds.,
2003); DEVELOPMENT DATA GROUP, THE WORLD BANK, 2008 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 4
(2008), available at http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi08.pdf (last visited Jan. 3,
2015).
See DAVID N. PELLOW, RESISTING GLOBAL TOXICS: TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 8 (2007).
See Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, supra note 6, at 80-84.
See Rees & Westra, supra note 9, at 110; Julian Agyeman et al., Joined-up Thinking: Bringing
Together Sustainability, Environmental Justice, and Equity, in JUST SUSTAINABILITIES:
DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 1, 4.
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peoples.13 In both the North and the South, the communities most burdened by
crushing poverty, ill health, political disempowerment, and social exclusion are
the ones most exposed to air and water pollution and most affected by climate
change and other global environmental problems.14
In the United States, the concentration of environmental hazards in lowincome communities and communities of color sparked a vibrant environmental
justice movement dedicated to the defense of disparately impacted
communities.15 Environmental justice activists have been at the forefront of
struggles over the siting of hazardous industries in low-income communities of
color; access to parks and open space; farmworker exposure to pesticides;
inequities in disaster preparedness and emergency response; workplace health
and safety; access to healthy and affordable food; and the enhancement of tribal
regulatory authority over indigenous lands.16
Environmental justice scholars and advocates identified four distinct aspects
of environmental injustice experienced by historically marginalized
communities.
They alleged (1) distributive injustice arising from
disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards and limited access to
environmental amenities, (2) procedural unfairness caused by exclusion from
environmental decision-making, (3) corrective injustice due to inadequate
enforcement of environmental legislation, and (4) social injustice because
environmental degradation is inextricably intertwined with deeper structural
ills, such as poverty and racism.17
13.
14.

15.

16.

17.

See Duncan McLaren, Environmental Space, Equity and the Ecological Debt, in JUST
SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 19, 21; Gonzalez, Environmental
Justice, supra note 6, at 78, 83-84, 96.
See U.N. Dev. Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2011: Sustainability and Equity: A
Better Future for All, 4-8, 50-60 (2011), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/
library/corporate/HDR/2011%20Global%20HDR/English/HDR_2011_EN_Complete.pdf; Rees &
Westra, supra note 9, at 100.
See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND
THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 19–33 (2001); Robert D. Bullard,
Environmental Justice in the Twenty-First Century, in THE QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 19, 19-25 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 2005).
See Daniel R. Farber & Deborah McCarthy, Neo-Liberalism, Globalization and the Struggle for
Ecological Democracy: Linking Sustainability and Environmental Justice, in JUST
SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 38, 45-53; Carmen G. Gonzalez,
Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The International Environmental Justice
Implications of Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 589-90 (2007) [hereinafter
Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms]; Alison Hope Alkon & Julian Agyeman, Introduction:
The Food Movement as Polyculture, in CULTIVATING FOOD JUSTICE: RACE, CLASS AND
SUSTAINABILITY 1, 4-10 (Alison Hope Alkon & Julian Agyeman eds., 2011); Dean B. Suagee,
Tribal Self-Determination and Environmental Federalism: Cultural Values as a Force for
Sustainability, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 229, 236-39 (1998).
See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681, 10681-82,
10688 (2000).
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Environmental justice struggles are taking place in both the global North and
global South.18 Among the most prominent are the struggles of the indigenous
peoples of the Arctic and of the Pacific Islands for climate justice,19 the
resistance of local and indigenous communities against environmentally
devastating oil drilling,20 and the challenge by transnational agrarian
movements (such as La Vía Campesina) to the corporate-dominated free trade
policies that undermine rural livelihoods, exacerbate poverty and hunger, and
degrade the environment.21
Many scholars and legal practitioners have framed the demands of the
environmental justice movements nationally and globally in the language of
human rights.22 Although most human rights treaties do not explicitly
recognize the right to a healthy environment, global and regional human rights
tribunals have determined that inadequate environmental protection may
violate the rights to life, health, food, water, property, privacy, and the collective
rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and resources.23 Human
rights violations caused by environmental degradation have been found to
infringe the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
and the American Convention on Human Rights despite the absence of explicit
environmental provisions in these treaties.24 In addition, three regional human
rights treaties (the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the San
Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Arab

18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.

24.
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See GORDON WALKER, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: CONCEPTS, EVIDENCE, AND POLITICS 24-25
(2012).
See Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change,
78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1633-46 (2007).
See generally ANTHONY BEBBINGTON ET AL., SOCIAL CONFLICT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY: EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH AMERICA (Anthony Bebbington ed., 2012);
PATRICIA I. VASQUEZ, OIL SPARKS IN THE AMAZON: LOCAL CONFLICTS, INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS,
AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2014); Tunde Agbola & Moruf Alabi, Political Economy of Petroleum
Development, Environmental Injustice and Selective Victimization: A Case Study of the Niger
Delta Region of Nigeria, in JUST SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 269,
269-88.
See Philip McMichael, Peasants Make Their Own History, But Not Just as They Please, in
TRANSNATIONAL AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS CONFRONTING GLOBALIZATION 37, 42-47 (Saturnino M.
Borras Jr. et al. eds., 2008).
See Agyeman et al., supra note 12, at 10-11.
See John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 168-78 (2009)
[hereinafter Knox, Climate Change]; Dinah Shelton, The Environmental Jurisprudence of
International Human Rights Tribunals, in LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 1112 (Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003).
See SVITLANA KRAVCHENKO & JOHN E. BONINE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES,
LAW AND POLICY 3-4 (2008).
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Charter on Human Rights) and one human rights declaration (the ASEAN
Declaration on Human Rights) include the substantive right to a healthy
environment.25 Furthermore, the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters recognizes procedural environmental rights.26 For
purposes of this article, the term environmental human rights refers collectively
to the right to a healthy environment, procedural environmental rights, and the
broad range of substantive human rights that may be violated by the failure to
protect the environment.27
The protection of environmental human rights by regional and international
human rights institutions has prompted the incorporation of environmental
human rights in national constitutions, legislation, and judicial decisions.28
Currently, at least 147 national constitutions explicitly reference environmental
rights and/or environmental responsibilities.29 Clearly, human rights law has
been and continues to be an important weapon in the struggle for environmental
justice.
While environmental law scholars and practitioners have harnessed the
power of human rights law to advocate for the individuals and communities that
have been harmed by environmental degradation, North-South economic and
political disparities pose significant challenges to the achievement of
environmental justice within and between nations.30
North-South
environmental inequities, like their domestic counterparts, manifest themselves
in the form of distributive, procedural, corrective, and social injustice. Although
the North has contributed disproportionately to global environmental
degradation and has reaped the associated economic benefits, the South

25

26.
27.

28.
29.
30.

See DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF
CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 84-88 (2012); ASEAN Human Rights
Declaration, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, art. 28 (Nov. 19, 2012),
http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/asean-human-rights-declaration.
See Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 (entered into force Oct.
30, 2001).
A comprehensive description of the substantive and procedural environmental human rights
under existing international law is set forth in the 14 reports submitted to the UN Human Rights
Council (UNHRC) by John Knox, the Independent Expert on Human Rights and the
Environment. See Independent Expert, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human
Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy, and Sustainable
Environment: Mapping Report, submitted to U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/53
(Dec. 30, 2013) (by John H. Knox) (summarizing the 14 reports on human rights and the
environment).
See BOYD, supra note 25, at 78, 106-07.
Id. at 47.
See Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, supra note 6, at 80-84.
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experiences distributive injustice in the form of disparate exposure to
environmental hazards. This disparity is due to the vulnerable geographic
locations and limited regulatory capabilities of many Southern nations, the
ongoing unsustainable extraction of the South’s natural resources to satisfy
Northern consumers, and the transfer of polluting industry and hazardous
wastes from the North to the South.31 North-South relations are also plagued
by procedural injustice because the North dominates decision-making in the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and even in multilateral environmental and human rights
treaty negotiations due to its greater economic and political influence.32
Corrective injustice is perhaps most evident in the inability of small island
nations to obtain redress for the imminent annihilation of their lands due to
climate-change-induced sea level rise.33 Finally, North-South environmental
conflicts are inextricably intertwined with colonialism and with post-colonial
trade, aid, finance, and investment policies that impoverished Southern nations
and enabled the North to exploit the South’s resources while externalizing the
social and environmental costs.34
An additional challenge to the achievement of environmental justice is the
imperial legacy of international law. From the colonial period to the present,
international law has generated a series of doctrines that justified Northern
political, economic, and military interventions in the South in order to achieve
“civilization” or “development” in accordance with supposedly universal
European norms.35 Human rights law is part of this tradition. Human rights
law is based on the natural law notion that human beings possess certain
inalienable, permanent, and fundamental rights by virtue of their humanity,
and that these universal rights “obtain in all places and at all times regardless
of what the positive law provides.”36 Southern scholars have questioned the
universal aspirations of human rights law in a multicultural world and have
pointed out that international law has historically been used by the North to
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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See RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION 12830 (2004); WALKER, supra note 18, at 95-98; Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An
Environmental Justice Critique of Free Trade, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 981, 987-1000 (2001)
[hereinafter Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism].
See ANAND, supra note 31, at 132–33; PATRICK HOSSAY, UNSUSTAINABLE: A PRIMER FOR GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 191-98 (2006); RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF,
WORLD BANK AND WTO 200-04 (2003).
See Maxine Burkett, Climate Reparations, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 509, 513-20 (2009).
See Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms, supra note 16, at 595-602.
See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2004) [hereinafter ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM].
DONALD K. ANTON & DINAH L. SHELTON, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 121
(2011).
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justify the conquest and dispossession of Southern peoples.37 Most recently,
international law has been deployed to legitimize military intervention and
economic reconstruction in places as diverse as Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and
Afghanistan in furtherance of Northern economic and political interests.38 In
the words of Makau Mutua, “[i]nternational human rights fall within the
historical continuum of the European colonial project in which whites pose as
the saviors of a benighted and savage non-European world.”39
The remainder of this article will examine the economic roots of
environmental injustice and the role of international law in the domination of
nature and of non-European peoples in order to assess the emancipatory
promise of environmental human rights law and discourse. Rather than restate
and supplement the existing scholarship on the advantages and disadvantages
of human rights-based approaches to environmental protection, the article will
serve as a cautionary note—reminding the reader that the discourse of human
rights is embedded in a larger canon that has often disserved the interests of the
global South and facilitated the pillage of the planet’s finite resources.

II. The Colonial and Post-Colonial Origins of Environmental
Injustice
The roots of contemporary environmental injustice lie in colonialism. The
European colonization of Asia, Africa, and the Americas devastated indigenous
societies and wreaked havoc on the flora and fauna of the colonized territories
through logging, mining, and plantation agriculture.40 European colonization
transformed self-sufficient subsistence economies into economic outposts of
Europe that produced agricultural commodities, minerals and timber, and
purchased manufactured goods.41 It also paved the way for contemporary social
and economic inequality by dispossessing indigenous farmers, uprooting and
enslaving millions of Africans, and importing indentured workers to provide
cheap labor for their colonial overlords.42

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 52 (2006).
See Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law, supra note 5, at 770-71; M. Sornarajah,
Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International Law, 2006 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 19, 4655.
Makau Mutua, The Complexity of Universalism in Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH
MODESTY 51, 61 (András Sajó ed., 2004).
See CLIVE PONTING, A GREEN HISTORY OF THE WORLD: THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE COLLAPSE OF
GREAT CIVILIZATIONS 130-36 (1991).
See id. at 194-212.
See id. at 130-40, 196-99, 203-12.
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The colonial enterprise was justified by notions of European cultural and
racial superiority that persist, in one form or another, to the present day.
Europeans regarded the native populations as inferior and asserted a moral
obligation to “civilize” the “savages” by compelling them to abandon their local
cultures and assimilate to European ways.43 In the post-colonial period,
Southern elites, deeply influenced by Eurocentric ideologies, subjugated their
own indigenous and minority populations in order to “modernize” and “develop”
them.44 Despite the end of formal colonialism, the dismantling of apartheid, and
the adoption of treaties prohibiting racial discrimination, racial hierarchies
remain deeply entrenched in both the global North and the global South, as
evidenced by, inter alia, widespread ethnic conflicts (including the genocide in
Rwanda), the social and economic legacy of apartheid in South Africa, hate
crimes against people of color and immigrants in Europe and the United States,
and the subordination of Afro-descendant and indigenous populations in the
Americas.45
The achievement of political independence by the Latin American colonies in
the 19th century and by the African and Asian colonies in the middle of the 20th
century did not significantly alter the South’s crippling dependence on a world
economy dominated by Europe and the United States.46 Because the terms of
trade consistently favored manufactured goods over primary commodities, the
nations of the global South found themselves on an economic treadmill that
prevented them from obtaining the capital to diversify or industrialize their
economies.47 Efforts to boost national earnings by increasing the production of

43.
44.

45.

46.
47.
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See Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 903, 930-35 (1997).
See ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, supra note 35, at 205-07; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Indigenous Peoples
and the State in Latin America: An Ongoing Debate, in MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA:
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, DIVERSITY, AND DEMOCRACY 24-26 (Rachel Sieder ed., 2002); Joel Ngugi, The
Decolonization-Modernization Interface and the Plight of Indigenous Peoples in Post-Colonial
Development Discourse in Africa, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 297, 324-26 (2002).
See generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
(2nd ed. 2012) (providing an introduction to study of racial hierarchies in the United States);
TANYA KATERI HERNANDEZ, RACIAL SUBORDINATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE STATE,
CUSTOMARY LAW, AND THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESPONSE (2013) (analyzing ethnic violence around
the globe); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE DEADLY ETHNIC RIOT (2001); PETER WADE, RACE AND
ETHNICITY IN LATIN AMERICA (2nd ed. 2010) (examining the changing perspectives on blackness
and indigeneity in Latin America); Hope Lewis, Transnational Dimensions of Racial Identity:
Reflecting on Race, the Global Economy, and the Human Rights Movement at 60, 24 MD. J. INT’L
L. 296, 298-99 (2009) (describing the advances and setbacks in the quest for racial justice over the
past six decades).
See PONTING, supra note 40, at 213-14.
See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: Critical Reflections on
Comparative Advantage. 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65, 78-80 (2006) [hereinafter Gonzalez,
Deconstructing the Mythology].
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minerals, timber, and agricultural commodities generally created a glut of
primary commodities on global markets that depressed prices, reduced Southern
export earnings, and only reinforced Southern economic vulnerability.48 The
South’s economic dependency enabled the North to exploit Southern resources
at prices that did not reflect the social and environmental consequences of
export production.49 As historian Clive Ponting observes:
Political and economic control of a large part of the world’s
resources enabled the industrialized world to live beyond the
constraints of its immediate resource base. Raw materials were
readily available for industrial development, food could be
imported to supply a rapidly rising population and a vast
increase in consumption formed the basis for the highest
material standard of living ever achieved in the world. Much of
the price of that achievement was paid by the population of the
Third World in the form of exploitation, poverty, and human
suffering.50
In the decades after the Second World War, the nations of the global South
formed coalitions to reform the international economic system by passing
resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly, where they held a
numerical majority.51 They sought to assert control over their economic
destinies by advancing the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources and the right to nationalize the Northern companies exploiting these
resources.52 They mobilized to secure a New International Economic Order
(NIEO) that would enhance Southern participation in global governance and
provide debt forgiveness, special trade preferences, and the stabilization of
export prices for primary commodities.53

48.
49.

50.
51.
52.
53.

PONTING, supra note 40, at 223.
See JOAN MARTINEZ-ALIER, THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR: A STUDY OF ECOLOGICAL
CONFLICTS AND VALUATION 214 (2002). Economist Joan Martinez-Alier refers to this trade among
rich and poor countries as “ecologically unequal exchange,” which he defines as
[T]he fact of exporting products from poor regions and countries at prices that do not
take into account local externalities caused by these exports or the exhaustion of
natural resources in exchange for goods and services from richer countries. The concept
focuses on the poverty and lack of political power of the exporting region, to emphasize
the idea of lack of alternative options, in terms of exporting other renewable goods with
lower local impacts.
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The debt crisis of the 1980s hastened the demise of the NIEO and facilitated
the rise of the free market economic model known as the Washington
Consensus.54 In order to secure debt repayment assistance from the IMF and
the World Bank, debtor nations in the global South were required to adopt a
one-size-fits-all model of economic development that included deregulation,
privatization, trade liberalization, slashing social safety nets, and the
intensification of export production to service the foreign debt.55 These policies
increased poverty and inequality; reinforced the South’s economically
disadvantageous dependence on the export of raw materials; bankrupted small
farmers by putting them in direct competition with highly subsidized
transnational agribusiness; sharply accelerated rural-to-urban migration; and
enabled transnational corporations to dominate many of the newly privatized
economic sectors.56
The export-driven economic reforms mandated by the IMF and the World
Bank accelerated the North’s overconsumption of the planet’s resources by
increasing the supply and driving down the price of agricultural products,
minerals, and timber.57 Indebted, impoverished, and desperate for foreign
capital, Southern nations also became a convenient dumping ground for
hazardous wastes from the global North and a magnet for polluting industry,
including the mining and petroleum extraction industries that had exploited the
South’s resources for generations.58 Indeed, former World Bank chief economist
Lawrence Summers wrote an infamous memorandum advocating the relocation
of polluting industries from the North to the South.59
Having industrialized by appropriating the South’s resources without regard
to the environmental and social costs (including the release of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere), the North maintains an ecological footprint that dwarfs that
of the South and has brought the planet’s ecosystems to the brink of collapse.60
A country’s ecological footprint is the area of land and water required to produce
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the resources it consumes and to assimilate the wastes it generates.61 While the
average global per capita ecological footprint is 2.8 hectares, residents of the
global North have an average per capita ecological footprint of 5 to 10 hectares.62
By contrast, the South’s average per capita ecological footprint is less than one
hectare, and even China has a per capita ecological footprint of only 1.2
hectares.63 Although the planet possesses approximately 12 billion productive
hectares, the human population’s total ecological footprint is almost 17 billion
hectares.64 This means that we are exceeding the planet’s ecological carrying
capacity, confirming that it is biophysically impossible for everyone in the world
to enjoy the North’s consumption-driven lifestyle. If we are to achieve
sustainability and ensure an adequate standard of living for the world’s poor, it
is essential for the North to scale back its overconsumption of the planet’s
resources.65
Scholars and activists have argued that the global North owes an ecological
debt to the countries and peoples of the global South for centuries of economic
exploitation, decades of ill-advised “development” programs, and consumption
patterns that have devastated the planet’s ecosystems.66 The North incurred
this debt through “resource plundering, unfair trade, environmental damage
and the free occupation of environmental space to deposit waste”67 and through
the displacement of Southern peoples and the destruction of their “natural
heritage, culture and sources of sustenance.”68 Indeed, this ecological debt is
one of the key manifestations of North-South environmental injustice. Before
examining the role of environmental human rights in addressing these
inequities, it is essential to discuss the complicity of international law in the
perpetuation of North-South inequality.

III. International Law and the Peoples and Territories of the
Global South
International law played a prominent role in the subordination of the global
South by providing the legal justification for the conquest of nature and of non61.
62.
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65.
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67.
68.
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European peoples. Colonization and conquest were initially authorized by papal
edicts from the time of the Crusades recognizing the right of Christians to seize
the lands of non-Christians.69 Under the influence of the 16th century Spanish
theologian and jurist Francisco de Vitoria, the justifications for the conquest
shifted to natural law. Vitoria argued that the indigenous peoples of the
Americas were rational human beings bound by universal natural law and were
therefore entitled to exercise ownership over their lands.70 However, because
the Indians’ form of governance was deemed inferior to the universal (i.e.,
European) standard, it was appropriate for the Spanish to intervene in their
affairs as guardians or trustees.71 Furthermore, if these “uncivilized” Indians
violated natural law by refusing to allow the Spanish to travel on Indian lands,
engage in commerce with them, or convert them to Christianity, then the
Spanish were entitled to wage a “just war” against them, to enslave them, and
to seize their lands.72 Writing a century after Vitoria, Hugo Grotius endorsed
Vitoria’s conclusions, although he discarded the Christian mission as one of the
justifications for a just war.73
The emergence of independent nation-states in Europe following the 1648
Treaty of Westphalia (which ended the Thirty Years’ War and diminished the
power of the Roman Catholic Church) produced new legal justifications for the
colonial enterprise.74 The 18th century Swiss diplomat Emmerich de Vattel
declared that states represented the highest form of human association and
were entitled to territorial integrity, exclusive jurisdiction over their internal
affairs, and freedom from external intervention.75 However, Vattel, like his
predecessors, adopted Eurocentric models of the nation-state that excluded
indigenous peoples.76 Vattel proclaimed that peoples organized primarily along
tribal or kinship lines without hierarchical, centralized authority and exclusive
territorial domains were not entitled to the benefits of statehood and were
therefore subject to conquest.77 Vattel’s writings also provided the intellectual
justification for the doctrine of terra nullius, which was used extensively by the
69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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European colonizers to dispossess nomadic hunter-gatherer societies on the
ground that failure to cultivate the land rendered their territories “vacant” and
therefore subject to appropriation by European invaders.78
In the 19th century, the apogee of colonialism, prominent legal scholars
adopted explicitly racial and cultural criteria to designate certain states as
civilized and therefore sovereign, and certain other states as uncivilized and
therefore non-sovereign.79 As Antony Anghie explains, “all non-European
societies, regardless of whether they were regarded as completely primitive or
relatively advanced, were outside the sphere of law, and European society
provided the model which all societies had to follow if they were to progress.”80
Acceptance into the family of nations required non-European states to transform
their domestic legal systems and their methods of conducting foreign affairs to
comport with European norms.81
International law was deeply influenced by scholars and philosophers of the
European Enlightenment, who regarded non-European societies as “trapped in a
state of nature,” and believed that the conquest of nature and the development
of industry were key duties of all civilized nations.82 John Westlake, a
prominent 19th century international lawyer, argued that the division of the
colonized territories among European nations was necessary to avoid armed
conflict among civilized (white) states in their inevitable competition for the
resources occupied by uncivilized (non-white) “natives.”83 His rationale was as
follows:
The inflow of the white race cannot be stopped where there is
land to cultivate, ore to be mined, commerce to be developed,
sport to enjoy, curiosity to be satisfied. If any fanatical admirer
of savage life argued that whites ought to be kept out, he would
only be driven to the same conclusion by another route, for a
government on the spot would be necessary to keep them out.
Accordingly, international law has to treat such natives as
78.
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uncivilized. It regulates, for the mutual benefit of civilized
states, the claims which they make to sovereignty over the
region, and leaves the treatment of the natives to the conscience
of the state to which sovereignty is awarded, rather than
sanction their interest being made an excuse the more for war
between civilized claimants, devastating the region and the
cause of suffering to the natives themselves.84
In short, international law rendered European cultural norms universal and
justified European domination of nature and of non-European territories and
peoples. In accordance with Westlake’s logic, the European powers divided up
the African continent after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 in order to avoid
open warfare among European states in their scramble for African colonies.85
The European practice of drawing territorial boundaries without regard to the
complex cultures and political organizations of African societies laid the
groundwork for many of the conflicts that plague the African continent to this
day.86
In the aftermath of the First World War, the League of Nations devised
economic criteria to justify the continuation of the colonial enterprise.87 Instead
of relying on racial and cultural criteria, the League distinguished between the
“advanced” nations of Europe and the “backward” territories to authorize the
ongoing international supervision of the colonies of the defeated Ottoman
Empire and Germany.88 These “backward peoples” were placed under the
tutelage of the League’s Mandate Powers (generally Britain and France) until
they were transformed into modern states capable of self-government.89 The
techniques developed under the Mandate System to supervise, measure,
manage, and control the progress of the “backward territories” would later be redeployed by the IMF and the World Bank to perpetuate systems of Northern
domination of the global South in furtherance of yet another iteration of the
North’s “civilizing mission.”90
After the Second World War, decolonization movements in the global South
significantly altered the composition of the United Nations, and enabled the
newly independent states to articulate legal doctrines designed to protect and
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enhance their hard-won sovereignty, including the collective right of all peoples
to self-determination, the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources, and the right to development.91 As North-South struggles shifted to
international economic law, the South introduced new legal principles, such as
the principle of special but differential treatment in international trade law,
designed to reduce North-South economic disparities by providing more
favorable treatment to Southern nations.92 Differential treatment was also
incorporated into international environmental law through the principle of
common but differentiated responsibility, which imposes asymmetrical
obligations on Northern and Southern states in recognition of the North’s
disproportionate contribution to global environmental degradation and its
greater technological and financial resources.93
The principle was
operationalized in several treaties, including the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (which contains differential phase-out
schedules for ozone-depleting substances for Northern and Southern countries)
and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (which exempts Southern nations from binding emission
reduction obligations).94
Despite these innovations, Southern aspirations for a more equitable
international order were thwarted by the hegemony of Northern economic
development models premised on material accumulation, control of nature,
unlimited economic growth, and rejection of indigenous knowledge, practices,
and beliefs as obstacles to “modernization.”95 Rather than providing reparations
for the harm caused by colonialism, the global North, in the decades following
the Second World War, ascribed Southern poverty to “underdevelopment,” and
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offered scientific and technical assistance to enable the South to “catch up.”96
Development was portrayed as a universal aspiration and measured in
Northern economic terms—primarily gross national product (GNP), later
supplemented by reduction in poverty, hunger, and disease.97 Encouraged to
borrow money from Northern commercial banks to finance development
projects, Southern states sought IMF and World Bank assistance when
skyrocketing interest rates and spiking oil prices brought these debtor nations
to the brink of default.98 As a condition of debt relief, the IMF and the World
Bank required debtor nations to implement structural adjustment programs
that exacerbated poverty and inequality in the global South.99 These programs
required, inter alia, drastic cuts in government spending that deprived
vulnerable populations of access to education, health care, and other social
services, and sparked widespread popular protests.100 Beginning in the 1990s,
the World Bank responded to its critics by expanding its intervention in the
global South to encompass poverty alleviation, environmental management, and
a variety of rule of law programs designed to create a favorable climate for
foreign investment.101 In short, the development discourse justified the North’s
continuing intervention in the South and promoted the consumption-oriented
lifestyle of the United States as the new standard of civilization to which all
should aspire.102
Underlying
the
civilized/uncivilized,
advanced/backward,
and
developed/developing dichotomy was the Eurocentric notion that civilization and
humanity are measured by a society’s distance from nature—by its willingness
to control nature through science and technology to serve human ends.103
Communities that engage in subsistence production, resist wage labor, or
disdain the accumulation of material wealth were pronounced uncivilized and in
need of development.104
Development was deemed to require the
commoditization of nature (private property) and human activity (labor), everincreasing material consumption, international commerce, and continuous
economic growth.105
Even sustainable development, the centerpiece of
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contemporary global environmental law and policy, was incorporated by the
North into the dominant development paradigm by treating environmental
protection as a technical problem that could be addressed through better
planning and engineering.106 The Northern ideology of nature as a resource to
be dominated for the satisfaction of human needs was exported to the South and
often supplanted more complex cultural traditions that viewed humans and
nature as inherently interdependent.107
Ironically, the IMF and the World Bank used the language of human rights
(the promotion of “good governance”) to justify policies designed to further a
neoliberal economic agenda.108 Like “development,” good governance possesses
universal appeal rooted in notions of democracy, accountability, transparency,
and participation.109 However, the good governance framework attributed
Southern “underdevelopment” to deficiencies in Southern states rather than to
the legacy of colonialism or the failure of the economic reforms imposed through
structural adjustment, and thereby legitimated the intensification of Northern
neoliberal interventions.110 Barred by their respective Articles of Agreement
from interfering in politics, the IMF and the World Bank embraced those human
rights compatible with their economic and financial mandates (such as ensuring
debt repayment by promoting economic growth through privatization and
deregulation).111 The primary goal of the good governance initiatives became
the reform of law, the judiciary, and the public sector in order to promote
economic liberalization.112 Like the free market reforms designed to produce
“development,” good governance was deployed as yet another tool to manage and
transform Southern nations so as to further Northern economic interests.113
The human rights framework created to protect the dignity and intrinsic worth
of human beings was “steadily supplanted by a trade-friendly, market-friendly,
human rights paradigm” that facilitated the enforcement of contracts and the
protection of private property for the benefit of global capital.114 Instead of
106.
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reforming the fundamental structures of the international economy to empower
the global South and reduce inequality, the “good governance” initiatives
emphasized the need to reform “backward” developing countries and further
entrenched the power of the IMF and the World Bank on terms that were
largely disadvantageous to the global South.115
The end of the Cold War and the rise of U.S. hegemony in international
affairs inaugurated a new role for international human rights law—legitimating
Northern military intervention in Southern nations for ostensibly humanitarian
purposes.116 United States-led interventions in Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and
Afghanistan were justified as efforts to promote democratic governance, protect
human rights, and/or combat terrorism.117 Like the colonial era civilizing
mission to Christianize the “savages,” these interventions were premised on the
legitimacy of using military force to discipline “failed” or “rogue” states.118 The
North thereby reproduced the human rights narrative of the white savior
“taming” or “civilizing” savage or despotic Southern states in order to rescue
“backward” peoples who cannot help themselves.119 This narrative cloaks
Northern foreign policy interests in the language of humanitarianism and
demonstrates yet again the tenuous sovereignty of Southern nations.120
The legitimacy of these “humanitarian” interventions was called into question
by the complicity of the North in the perpetuation of violence and poverty in the
global South. As Thomas Pogge points out:
As ordinary citizens of the rich countries, we are deeply
implicated in these harms. We authorize our firms to acquire
natural resources from tyrants and we protect their property
rights in resources so acquired. We purchase what our firms
produce out of such resources and thereby encourage them to act
as authorized . . . . We also authorize and encourage other firms
of ours to sell to the tyrants what they need to stay in power—
from aircraft and arms to surveillance and torture equipment.121
Critics also emphasized that military interventions “solve little or nothing, and
in a remarkable number of cases seem only to increase the instability of a
country and a region, as well as the misery of masses of people.”122 Finally,
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some observers pointed out that the ultimate objective of many of these
interventions appeared to be economic reconstruction of the invaded states
along neoliberal economic lines.123
Transnational corporations headquartered in the North and rapacious
Southern elites have been the prime beneficiaries of Northern economic,
political, and military interventions in the global South in order to impose
market-friendly economic reforms.124 From the oil drilling operations of
Chevron/Texaco in Ecuador to the mining activities of Freeport-McMoran in
Indonesia, transnational corporations (and their counterparts in certain
emerging Southern nations) are frequently embroiled in some of the worst
human rights and environmental abuses.125 Far from defending the rights of
their citizens, post-colonial states often pursue socially and environmentally
destructive development strategies and ruthlessly repress grassroots resistance
movements.126 Eager to secure foreign investment, Southern governments often
strive to create a friendly environment for foreign capital by entering into onesided bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and host state government
agreements (HGAs) that protect the property rights of the foreign investor and
restrict the ability of Southern states to regulate in the public interest. These
agreements generally do not impose any corresponding duties on the foreign
investor to comply with human rights or environmental standards or obligate
the investor’s home state to regulate the extraterritorial conduct of its
corporations.127 As Upendra Baxi observes:
A progressive state [under contemporary globalization] is one
that protects global capital against political instability and
market failures. A progressive state is one that represents
accountability not so much directly to its people, but one that
offers itself as a good pupil to the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund. A progressive state is one, which instead of
promoting world visions of a just international order, learns the
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virtue of debt repayment on schedule. Moreover, a progressive
state is now one which is required to garner conceptions of good
governance neither from the histories of struggles against
colonization and imperialism nor from its internal social and
human rights movements but from the shifting prescriptions of
the global institutional gurus of globalization.128

IV. Can Environmental Human Rights Promote Environmental
Justice?
Environmental human rights hold immense promise for historically
subordinated communities as a tool of mobilization against their governments’
abuses of nature and of vulnerable populations. The language of human rights
is morally compelling, and suggests that human rights should, in theory, trump
other, less weighty considerations (such as economic efficiency).129 Unlike
international environmental law, human rights law imposes obligations on
states for harms that are purely domestic, and enables victims of substantive
and procedural human rights violations to enforce these rights through citizen
complaint mechanisms, thereby exposing human rights violations to
international scrutiny.130
However, environmental human rights must be approached not as an object
of veneration, but as one instrument in the pursuit of environmental justice that
has both advantages and disadvantages. There is an important distinction
between the bottom-up environmental human rights discourse deployed by
grassroots environmental justice movements and the top-down incorporation of
environmental human rights in treaties and other legal instruments. Once
human rights are institutionalized in the international human rights system,
they become embedded in pre-existing relations of power that generally favor
Northern states and transnational corporations. While institutionalization is
necessary for the implementation of environmental human rights, scholars and
advocates must identify and challenge practices and policies that compromise
their effectiveness. Rather than reiterate the excellent work of other scholars on
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the benefits of an environmental human rights framework,131 this section draws
upon Parts II and III of this article to examine its limitations and to consider
how it might evolve to realize its emancipatory promise.
International human rights law and institutions were created by a small
group of states in the aftermath of the Second World War when most African
and Asian nations were under colonial domination.132
Critics of the
international human rights system argue that the human rights canon
generally favors civil and political rights over economic, social, and cultural
rights; elevates individual rights over collective rights; and implicitly regards
Western-style liberal democracy as the only legitimate form of government.133
In order to avoid universalizing yet another Eurocentric model, it is essential to
expose the Northern biases of the human rights corpus, infuse it with Southern
conceptions of human dignity, and transform it so as to challenge the
inequitable economic order that perpetuates the subordination of the global
South and the abuse of nature and of historically marginalized communities.
The remainder of this section will identify seven limitations of the human rights
canon, discuss the implications for environmental human rights, and propose
ways of enhancing the ability of environmental human rights law and advocacy
to challenge environmental injustice.
A. False Universalism that Cloaks Northern Domination
International human rights law (environmental or otherwise) is problematic
to the extent that it presents itself as neutral, universal, apolitical, nonideological, timeless, and eternal134—thereby obscuring the historic inequities
that gave rise to anti-colonial struggles, the North-South divide, and
environmental injustice within and between nations. By granting humanity
formal equality (the same right to life, health, food, water, privacy, a healthy
environment), human rights law erases the culpability of the North for poverty
and environmental degradation in the South, and cloaks further acts of
domination (such as “good governance” initiatives and “humanitarian”
interventions) in the benevolent rhetoric of universality and common humanity.
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As Balakrishnan Rajagopal points out, the global North has gone out of its way
to construct human rights as a “post-imperial discourse unsullied by the ugly
colonial politics of pre-1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) initiated the modern human rights movement.”135 Scholars like Mary
Ann Glendon portray the UDHR as the culmination of a historical process,
whereby the concerns of the poor and marginalized (states as well as peoples)
triumphed over the interests of the mighty and powerful.136 However, on closer
examination, the complicity of the human rights project with the colonial
enterprise becomes evident:
1) The UDHR did not apply directly to the colonial areas and
was subjected to intense maneuvering by Britain at the drafting
stage to prevent its application to its colonies despite Soviet
pressure; 2) anticolonial struggles were hardly ever taken up for
scrutiny at the UN Commission on Human Rights before many
Third World states came on board in 1967, when membership
was enlarged, and even then remained tangential on the agenda
formally; 3) anti-colonial nationalist revolts in places such as
Kenya and Malaya were successfully characterized by the
British as ‘emergencies’ to be dealt with as law and order issues,
thereby avoiding the application of either human rights or
humanitarian law to these violent encounters; 4) the main antiimperial strand of human rights discourse—the critique of
apartheid in South Africa and of Israeli policies in Palestinian
territories using human rights terms by the Third World during
the 1960s to 1980s—remained tangential to the mainstream
human rights discourse coming from the West.137
Environmental justice scholars and activists must recognize that human
rights law is a malleable tool that can be used to obscure and perpetuate
Northern domination or to subvert it. In order to promote environmental justice
through human rights law and advocacy, it is important to identify and
challenge certain grand narratives that maintain Northern hegemony, including
the tendency of Northern states and non-governmental organizations (the
“saviors”) to target Southern states (the “savages”) for human rights violations
without taking into account Northern complicity.138 For example, the criminal
tribunals that prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity do not reach the
former colonial powers that stoked ethnic conflict (such as France and Belgium
in Rwanda), the states that aided and abetted repressive military regimes (such
135.
136.
137.
138.

174

Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law, supra note 5, at 769.
MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 32-34 (2002).
Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law, supra note 5, at 769-70.
See Mutua, Savages, Victims and Saviors, supra note 119, at 224-33.

Environmental Justice, Human Rights, and the Global South

as U.S. support of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile), or the states and
transnational corporations that benefited from civil wars and resource conflicts
(such as the arms merchants and resource extractive industries in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo).139 A critical approach to environmental
human rights law must lay bare the contemporary and historic causes of
environmental human rights abuses, disrupt the savior-savage narrative, and
ensure that the discourse and the practice of human rights address the deeper
structural inequities that produce environmental injustice.
Challenging the hegemony of the savior-savage narrative may entail, among
other things, revisiting the official history of the human rights canon and
exhuming information about the role of Southern countries in the negotiation,
drafting, and approval by the UN General Assembly of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.140 Despite the popular view of Northern states as
the architects of the UDHR, recent scholarship reveals a far more complex
picture.141 Of the fifty-six countries that participated in the very public and
highly contentious drafting process, Southern states were active and vocal in the
negotiations, and were instrumental in the recognition of socioeconomic rights,
women’s rights, and racial equality.142 Notwithstanding Eleanor Roosevelt’s
leadership role, the U.S. delegation was ambivalent about the provisions
forbidding racial discrimination and embracing socioeconomic rights, and the
UDHR was unpopular in the United States.143 European delegates were also
profoundly conflicted and divided.144 “Contrary to a belief that—ironically—has
served hegemonic interests, the UDHR was not the brainchild of the great
powers. At best it was their stepchild.”145 Retrieving this history is an
important step toward decolonizing and re-conceptualizing the human rights
project and re-invigorating the economic, social, and cultural rights that were
included in the human rights corpus due, in large part, to Southern insistence.
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Finally, a critical approach to the human rights canon should acknowledge
that the discourse of human rights predates the UDHR and has deep roots in
the struggles for liberty, equality, and self-determination of the peoples of Asia,
Africa, and the Americas.146
In this interpretation, events such as the Conquest of America,
the independence gained by colonies throughout America in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, the Mexican Revolution,
the decolonisation of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle
East in the Twentieth Century, the Civil Rights Movement, the
Cold War, the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the emergence of
indigenous groups, social movements and entire peoples fighting
today in the Global South against the policies of contemporary
dictators, empires, transnational corporations and international
financial institutions also have a place.147
This alternative historical account rejects the Eurocentric framing of the human
rights project articulated by both human rights proponents and critics, and
recognizes the ways that marginalized communities have used the discourse of
human rights to transform their societies. According to the popular Eurocentric
view, first generation human rights (civil and political rights) emerged from the
French Revolution; second generation human rights (economic, social, and
cultural rights) were recognized in the early twentieth century after the Russian
Revolution and the implementation of social democracy in Europe; and third
generation human rights (including the right to self-determination, the right to
development, and the right to a healthy environment) did not emerge until the
second half of the twentieth century.148 This generational framework not only
purports to describe the evolution of human rights, but also is often understood
to reflect the hierarchical priority of these rights.149 A narrative that recognizes
the co-evolution of these generations of human rights in the course of both
North-South anti-imperial struggles and a variety of local and transnational
social justice movements breaks down these generational hierarchies, highlights
the indivisibility of human rights, and gives Southern states and
disenfranchised communities voice and agency in the advancement of the
human rights project.150 De-colonizing the history of the human rights
movement reveals that the architects of human rights are communities in
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struggle (including peoples struggling against colonial and post-colonial forms of
domination), and disavows the savior-savage narrative of human rights as a
“gift from the West to the rest of the world.”151
B. Failure to Hold Northern States and Transnational Corporations
Responsible for their Complicity in Human Rights Abuses in the
South
International human rights institutions, such as the international criminal
tribunals discussed above, have generally failed to hold accountable the
Northern states and corporations that are complicit in human rights and
environmental abuses. Human rights law generally operates vertically—giving
citizens of a state a claim against their government. However, as explained in
Parts II and III of this article, nations in the global South are structurally
dependent on the global North through international institutions (like the
World Bank and the IMF), through the World Trade Organization (in which the
South wields limited bargaining power), through international investment law
(which often protects the interests of the foreign investor against those of the
local citizens and the environment), and through the vast economic power of
transnational corporations (TNCs).152 In order to grapple with environmental
injustice both within and among nations, it is necessary to take into account the
constellation of national and global actors that come together to produce these
inequities.
National governments must be held accountable for their
environmental human rights abuses, but it is also essential for human rights
law to explicitly authorize claims against the actors in the global North (both
states and TNCs) that wield vast economic power over these governments and
are implicated in these abuses.
One strategy to address this shortcoming is the evolution of human rights law
(via treaty/legislation, soft law, litigation, or interpretation by human rights
bodies) to explicitly recognize and enforce what John Knox, the United Nations
Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment, calls diagonal
human rights. Diagonal human rights are rights held by individuals against
foreign governments for the extraterritorial consequences of actions taken by
those governments directly (such as constructing dams or power plants) or
indirectly (through the power they wield in international financial institutions
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like the IMF and the World Bank, or through financing or failing to regulate the
conduct of TNCs).153
The United Nations Charter imposes diagonal or extraterritorial obligations
on all states by requiring international cooperation to ensure the realization of
human rights. Pursuant to Article 56 of the UN Charter, “[a]ll Members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
Organization” to achieve the purposes set forth in Article 55 of the Charter.154
These purposes include “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion.”155
In addition to the obligations imposed by the UN Charter, some human rights
treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), have been interpreted by UN bodies to impose
specific extraterritorial obligations.156 For example, article 2(1) of the ICESCR
requires states parties “to take steps, individually and through international
assistance and cooperation . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization” of the rights recognized in the treaty.157 The UN Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the body responsible for
overseeing the ICESCR, has relied on this language to conclude that states
parties have extraterritorial obligations with respect to the rights to food, water,
and health.158 This includes the duty to refrain from interfering with the
enjoyment of these rights in other countries;159 the duty to prevent their own
citizens and enterprises from violating these rights in other countries;160 and the
obligation to fulfill these rights in other countries by facilitating access or
153.
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providing the necessary aid.161 States parties must also ensure that the rights
to food, water, and health are “given due attention in the negotiation of
international agreements,” and should consider the development of additional
legal instruments for this purpose.162 Finally, the CESCR, in its interpretation
of the rights to water and health, has explicitly determined that states parties
should ensure that international and regional agreements (including trade
liberalization agreements) and the practices of international financial
institutions (such as the World Bank and the IMF) do not adversely impact the
realization of the these rights.163
In 2011, an eminent group of human rights experts (including former and
current Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Council) adopted a series
of principles, known as the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations
of States in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, that enumerate
and explain the extraterritorial obligations of states under existing
international law.164 These extraterritorial obligations include the duty to
ensure that international organizations to which a state belongs (such as the
IMF and the World Bank) act in accordance with pre-existing human rights
obligations;165 the duty to elaborate, interpret, and apply international
agreements (including free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties)
in a manner consistent with human rights obligations;166 and the duty to ensure
that non-state actors (such as TNCs) do not impair human rights in other
countries.167
An example of a diagonal or extraterritorial human rights claim is the
petition filed by the Inuit against the United States before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights for human rights violations caused by climate
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change.168 The petition alleged that the United States, by failing to take
meaningful action to curtail its greenhouse gas emissions, had violated the
human rights of the Inuit in both Canada and the United States under the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, including the rights to
life, health, property, culture, physical integrity, security, residence, and
movement; the right to use and enjoy their ancestral lands; and the right to
subsistence.169 While the claims of the Inuit residing in the United States were
vertical (against the state in which they reside), those of the Canadian Inuit
were diagonal (against a foreign government).170 Because the Commission
refused to process the claim on the grounds that it could not determine whether
the alleged facts were sufficient to constitute a violation of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Commission over diagonal human rights claim was not resolved—
leaving the door open to future claims of this nature.171
168.
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An important strategy to promote diagonal human rights is holding
governments accountable for failure to regulate the conduct of their corporations
abroad.
Under the ICESCR, states have an obligation to ensure that
corporations under their jurisdiction and control do not violate economic, social,
and cultural rights in other countries.172 If a state neglects to exercise due
diligence to prevent such violations, then it may be liable on that basis.173
Similarly, capital exporting countries (in the North or the South) that enter into
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with capital importing countries may be
liable for the human rights violations of their TNCs to the extent that the BITs
restrict the ability of the capital importing country to regulate the foreign
investor in a manner that protects environmental human rights.174 Indeed,
these BITs as well as the host state agreements (HGAs) between the foreign
investor and the Southern state should contain legally binding human rights
and environmental obligations and provide for the enforcement of these
provisions in both the home state and the host state (including civil actions by
persons injured due to the acts or decisions of the foreign investor).175
Finally, efforts to promote environmental human rights must address the
accountability of corporations for human rights violations. While a complete
discussion of the legal strategies that might be pursued to achieve corporate
accountability is beyond the scope of this article, possible approaches include
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enhancing the human rights enforcement capacity of Southern countries,
strengthening the mechanisms available in the home state to adjudicate human
rights violations abroad, and developing treaties that impose human rights
obligations directly on corporations.
In 2003, the United Nations draft Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights proposed the direct imposition of human rights obligations on
TNCs.176 However, under intense pressure from corporate interests, the state
members of the former UN Human Rights Commission rejected this
approach.177 Several years later, the United Nations Special Representative of
the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and other Business Enterprises (Professor John G. Ruggie)
developed a governance framework and a set of Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights that focused on building the capacity of states to regulate
TNCs and included only non-binding norms for corporations (except the binding
obligation to comply with international criminal law).178 Critics of the Ruggie
framework described this approach as “the abandonment . . . of an international
legal approach to the problem of corporate impunity in favour of soft norms and
private self-regulation.”179
Given the difficulties encountered by Northern and Southern states in
regulating the conduct of TNCs (including the diminished governance capacity
of Southern states due to the Northern interventions described in Parts II and
III of this article),180 it is essential to continue to advocate for enforceable
human rights obligations against corporate actors. From the colonial period to
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the present, international law and domestic law have been deployed to promote
foreign trade and investment and to limit the ability of states to regulate
transnational corporations.181 Because the rights and protections available to
corporate actors were created by law, it is only appropriate to address the
impunity of transnational corporations for their extraterritorial environmental
human rights violations by negotiating multilateral treaties imposing human
rights obligations on these enterprises.182 In June 2014, the UN Human Rights
Council approved a resolution establishing an intergovernmental working group
to develop a legally binding instrument imposing human rights obligations on
corporations.183 While powerful Northern states will undoubtedly resist and
reject such a treaty, the resolution represents an important step toward a legal
framework that will “begin to shift the balance of power between transnational
corporate actors on the one hand, and Third World host states and victims of
corporate human rights abuses on the other.”184
C. The Challenge of Collective Human Rights
One of the hallmarks of environmental justice movements is their emphasis
on communitarian notions of justice.185 Human rights law, with its emphasis on
individual rights, may be ill-suited to the task of advancing the collective rights
of indigenous peoples, racial and ethnic minorities, and other subordinated
communities disparately burdened by environmental degradation. For example,
the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) has generally adopted an
individualistic approach to environmental human rights rather than viewing
the environment as a public good that affects the collective well-being of groups
of people residing in a particular location.186 In the case of Kyrtatos v. Greece,
which involved the illegal draining of a wetland, the Court held that the crucial
element in determining whether the conduct in question violated the applicants’
rights under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the European Convention) “is the existence of a
harmful effect on a person’s private or family sphere, and not simply the general
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deterioration of the environment. Neither Article 8 nor any of the other Articles
of the Convention are specifically designed to provide general protection of the
environment as such.”187 In 2012, the Council of Europe produced a manual
that provides practical guidance on the evolving environmental jurisprudence of
the Court under the European Convention and the European Charter.188
Confirming the Court’s restrictive view of environmental human rights, the
manual states that “[n]either the Convention nor the Charter are designed to
provide a general protection of the environment as such and do not expressly
guarantee a right to a sound, quiet and healthy environment.”189 Critics of the
European approach have argued that the Court’s jurisprudence fails to value
environmental integrity for society as a whole, “but only as a criterion to
measure the negative impact on a given individual’s life, property, private and
family life.”190
However, the case law emerging from the Inter-American human rights
system, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and even the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopts a much more
collective approach to environmental human rights. For example, in Mayagna
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights invalidated logging concessions awarded by Nicaragua to foreign
investors in the ancestral lands of the indigenous Awas Tingni community on
the basis of collective property rights.191 In Saramaka People v. Suriname, the
Inter-American Court used this rationale to protect the collective property
rights of an Afro-descendant community.192 In Social and Economic Rights
Action Centre v. Nigeria (the Ogoniland case), the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights concluded that the devastation wrought by
petroleum extraction violated the Ogoni people’s collective right to a healthy
environment.193 Finally, in Lubikon Lake Band v. Canada and in Francis Hopy
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and Tepoaitu Bessert v. France, the UN Human Rights Committee upheld the
petitioners’ contention that the challenged development projects (oil and gas
extraction and tourist development, respectively) imposed an unacceptable
burden on traditional lands and subsistence systems of indigenous communities
as a whole (and not just individual members of the group) in violation of Articles
27 (minority rights) and 17 (protection of family and private life) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.194
In short, historically marginalized communities in the global South and the
global North have successfully vindicated collective human rights in regional
human rights bodies. These victories illustrate the emancipatory potential of
environmental human rights law and advocacy and the ability of the human
rights system to progress and evolve in response to the demands of grassroots
environmental justice movements.
D. Anthropocentrism, the Domination of Nature, and the Rights of
Future Generations
Human rights law is, by definition, anthropocentric, and may therefore
universalize the Northern development model based on the domination of
nature. Many scholars have argued that the root of the present environmental
crisis is the globalization of the Western ideology that separates humans from
nature and regards nature in purely instrumental terms.195 Human rights law
has also tended to focus on present generations and to neglect the rights of
future generations.196 While a full discussion of anthropocentricism and future
generations is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to recognize that
many of the indigenous peoples who were constructed as “uncivilized” and in
need of “development” possess legal systems based on a sophisticated
understanding of the relationship between humans and nature and a concern
for the impact of present economic activity on future generations.197 While
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people do not always behave in accordance with their values and traditions,
these indigenous legal systems can nevertheless provide the foundation for a
more robust conception of human rights that acknowledges the interdependence
of humans and nature and promotes intergenerational equity. For example,
Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution became the first national constitution to provide for
the rights of nature, based on the principle of sumac kawsay, the Kichwa
concept of living in harmony with others and with nature (known in Spanish as
el buen vivir, or living well).198 In 2012, Bolivia promulgated the Law of Mother
Earth and Integral Development for Living Well, which likewise recognizes the
rights of nature.199 That same year, New Zealand granted legal personhood to
its longest navigable river, the Whanganui, in a major step toward the
resolution of the historic grievances of Māori peoples.200 Several countries,
including Bolivia, Ecuador, Germany, Norway, Kenya, and South Africa, have
recognized the rights of future generations in their constitutions.201 These legal
reforms do not obviate the tension between the rights of humans and nature,
but they do “shift individual and collective perceptions of nature, as something
with integrity and value,”202 thereby increasing the likelihood of more
thoughtful decisions regarding human activities that impact the environment
and the well-being of generations to come.
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E. Lack of Redress for Systemic Harms
Human rights law is generally designed to provide redress for human rights
violations with definite, identifiable perpetrators and victims, but may be illequipped to handle the North’s ecological debt to the South for centuries of
colonial exploitation (including slavery) and decades of “modernization” and
“development.”203 While the North’s overconsumption of the planet’s resources
and externalization of the social and environmental costs of economic activity
have undoubtedly violated the environmental human rights of billions of human
beings, proving these human rights violations would be challenging in a highly
globalized economy with complex supply chains. It would be difficult to identify
specific perpetrators and establish causal links between the conduct and the
harm in a manner that takes into account historic and current responsibility as
well as historic, current, and future impacts of the offending conduct. Indeed,
the UN Human Rights Council, in its 2009 report on human rights and climate
change, made similar observations about the difficulty of establishing liability
for climate change.204 The North’s refusal to accept responsibility for its historic
greenhouse gas emissions continues to be one of the major stumbling blocks in
the climate change negotiations.205
Rather than forsaking claims for systemic harm based on human rights law
or other applicable bodies of international law, environmental justice advocates
should carefully parse the existing legal frameworks and identify cracks in the
edifice that would allow these claims to proceed. For example, Maxine Burkett,
in her contribution to this symposium, argues that certain provisions in the
climate change adaptation framework support the creation of a compensation
mechanism for the rehabilitation of small island states harmed by unavoidable,
irreversible, and slow-onset events such as sea level rise, ocean acidification,
and drought.206 Similarly, in March 2014, a group of Caribbean nations
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announced that they had hired a British human rights law firm to sue several
European states (including Britain, France, and the Netherlands) in order to
obtain reparations for slavery, such as a formal apology, cancellation of the
foreign debt, and monetary compensation.207 Whether or not these strategies
are ultimately successful, they will influence public perceptions of historic and
contemporary inequities, clarify extremely significant areas of international law,
and create political momentum for redress to the victims of systemic injustice.
An example of an innovative (and ultimately successful) claim for
environmental harm caused by a former colonial power is the case brought in
1989 by the Pacific island nation of Nauru before the International Court of
Justice. Nauru sought reparations from Australia for environmental damage
caused by phosphate mining during Australia’s administration of Nauru
pursuant to the League of Nations Mandate System and its successor
Trusteeship System of the United Nations.208 Nauru alleged that Australia
violated the trusteeship provisions and several principles of international law,
including self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural
resources.209 In 1993, Nauru and Australia settled the claim for $107 million
under an agreement designed to rehabilitate the damaged lands.210 The Nauru
case illustrates the importance of creative use of existing legal doctrines to
address environmental injustice.
F. Treating Symptoms Rather than Root Causes
The human rights framework tends to mitigate the harshness of the global
economy without questioning its fundamental premises.211 It protects the rights
of specific individuals and communities on a case-by-case basis rather than
challenging paradigms of economic development that impose disproportionate
burdens on the planet’s most vulnerable communities. The case-by-case
approach can implicitly legitimize the existing distributions of wealth and power
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by dealing with environmental injustice as aberrant rather than recognizing it
as systemic. Tinkering with the discrete manifestations of injustice may divert
attention from efforts to challenge a failed development model based on the
myth of unlimited economic growth and externalization of environmental and
social costs.
For example, indigenous peoples have been particularly successful in
influencing the substantive content of international law through their
participation in both formal and informal decision-making and norm-creating
processes in regional and global law-making institutions.212 However, these
human rights victories have not always translated into success on the ground
due to the fragmented nature of international law and the failure of
international economic law to incorporate human rights norms. States and
TNCs continue to violate the rights of indigenous peoples by engaging in
environmentally devastating activities (including oil drilling and mining) on
indigenous ancestral lands against the express wishes of these communities.213
As one observer points out:
[I]ndigenous peoples’ human rights over their ancestral lands
and resources often collide with pre-existing international law
norms and other norms that continuously evolve under
international trade and investment law. Indigenous peoples’
rights over ancestral lands and resources exist outside of, and
arguably in subordination to, other norms of international law
such as state sovereignty over natural resources and states’
right to development. Moreover, corporate actors that benefit
from state-granted concessions may be considered to have more
rights over lands and resources than indigenous peoples that
occupy such lands.214
Thus, while continuing to advance environmental human rights in national,
regional, and international human rights bodies, environmental justice
movements in the North and the South must also engage vigorously with
international economic law and institutions if the triumphs achieved in the
human rights regime are to be more than pyrrhic victories.215 Environmental
justice advocates must question the dominant economic paradigms and propose
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alternatives that will place the interdependence of humans and nature at the
core and will promote environmental justice within and between nations.
G. Displacement of Local Conceptions of Human Dignity
Finally, one of the dangers of invoking international human rights law is that
it may crowd out competing visions of justice and human dignity.216 As
Balakrishnan Rajagopal explains:
The epistemological problem is the sheer assertion of power over,
and the elimination of, other discourses which may or may not
come from the same source as the Western liberal human rights
paradigm . . . . The empirical problem relates to the wide gap
that exists between the legal instantiations of rights to the lived
experience of rights, where one encounters the complex reality
that there are multiple sources of resistance, emancipation,
flourishing, protest and rights-making practices on the ground
that are competing and coexisting, and that the human rights
discourse is only one language of justice and emancipation.217
In other words, human rights norms often fail to adequately reflect the
complex and multi-dimensional forms of violence inflicted on subaltern
populations,218 to fully articulate the emancipatory aspirations and resistance
strategies of diverse grassroots social and environmental justice movements,219
and to represent the world views of non-Western legal and cultural traditions
(including Islamic, African, Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, and indigenous notions
of what it means to be human).220 In addition, as noted above, the redress
mechanisms of the international human rights system may be unwilling or
unable to provide reparations for systemic injustices such as slavery,
colonialism, and the North’s ecological debt to the South.
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One response to these critiques is to recognize that the human rights
framework, despite its limitations, has nevertheless empowered vulnerable
populations disparately burdened by environmental degradation.
Poor
communities in places as diverse as Russia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Argentina,
Chile, Romania, Turkey, Peru, and South Africa have deployed environmental
human rights to obtain access to clean drinking water or to address health risks
posed by industrial pollution.221 It is important for legal scholars to supplement
theoretical critiques of environmental human rights with empirical studies of
environmental justice struggles in order to evaluate the actual operation of
human rights norms and institutions and their ability to fulfill the aspirations
of subordinated communities.222
A second response is to highlight the ways that national and regional
interpretations of environmental human rights will inevitably be influenced by
local conceptions of human dignity that will supplement or perhaps replace
Eurocentric “universal” models.223
For example, both the Ecuadoran
Constitution and Bolivia’s Law of Mother Earth recognize the rights of nature
due, in part, to the incorporation of indigenous values and traditions into the
domestic legal system.224 Similarly, New Zealand’s decision to grant legal
personhood to the Whanganui River reflects a rapprochement between Western
and indigenous legal philosophies.225 At the regional level, the African Charter
of Human and Peoples’ Rights (which recognizes the right to a healthy
environment) emphasizes both the rights and duties of individuals consistent
with African conceptions of human beings as integral members of a larger
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community.226 This group-centered view of humanity is also evident in national
legal systems. Thus, South African public law, private law, and constitutional
interpretation have all been influenced by the indigenous concept of ubuntu, a
holistic view of human identity as interconnected with the environment and
with other persons.227
A third response is to acknowledge that environmental human rights, if they
are to fulfill their emancipatory potential, must evolve under pressure from
social movements that genuinely reflect the experiences, aspirations, and
perspectives of subaltern communities. The discourse of environmental justice,
understood not as a universal language, but as one inflected with local accents,
values, and vocabularies, can provide social movements with a language of
resistance that has not been coopted by international law-making processes and
institutions.228 For example, environmental justice can be invoked to demand
corrective justice in the form of reparations for historic injustice and systemic
violations of human rights (including reparations for slavery, colonialism, and
the North’s ecological debt to the South) in order to stimulate the development
of legal theories that will provide this relief.229 Similarly, environmental justice
can be deployed to demand not just the minimum entitlements necessary for a
decent life (as currently envisioned by the dominant interpretation of economic,
social and cultural rights),230 but distributional justice in the form of an equal
per capita entitlement to the planet’s resources consistent with ecological
limits.231 The end product of this approach would be convergence in the
ecological footprint of persons in the North and the South—and also within each
nation.232 Environmental justice can be used to devise legal and extra-legal
strategies to demand a more just and sustainable economic order and to
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influence the development of environmental human rights at the national,
regional, and international level.
In sum, far from casting doubt on the utility of the environmental human
rights framework, the limitations discussed in this section only highlight the
importance of political mobilization to create new rights and obligations and to
deploy existing rights in novel and creative ways. Human rights law and
discourse must be regarded as a tool to challenge environmental injustice rather
than an ossified and unchanging body of law. Thus, in its 2004 report on
environmental human rights, Friends of the Earth International unabashedly
calls for reparations for the ecological debt caused by the North’s depletion and
destruction of the South’s natural resources and highlights the plight of
communities affected by environmental degradation.233 Human rights law puts
a human face on environmental harm and empowers subordinated communities
to speak for themselves in domestic or international tribunals and in the court
of public opinion, as a means of naming and shaming human rights abusers and
drawing international attention to their own plight and that of similarly
situated communities.234 In doing so, it serves as a powerful tool to educate the
public about environmental injustice (current and historic), to build political
momentum for reparations, and to create a public dialogue about alternatives to
the current growth-at-any-cost economic model. As one commentator points out,
[E]nvironmental activists see human rights as fluid and (in a
good way) volatile and unstable. Unlike the lawyers they roam
beyond the documentation to find new rights. Unlike the
philosophers they do not pass their projects through a test rooted
in historical or rational consistency. What matters is what
works and what can be achieved.235
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educated the public about the causes and consequences of climate change, engaged the United
States on the need to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, and prompted the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights to hold hearings on the link between climate change and human
rights. For an analysis of the impact of the Inuit petition, see generally Osofsky, supra note 170,
at 313-38.
See Conor Gearty, Do Human Rights Help or Hinder Environmental Protection?, 1 J. OF HUM.
RTS. & THE ENV’T 7, 14 (2010).
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Conclusion
This article has highlighted what one observer calls “the paradox of
institutionalization.”236 On the one hand, the discourse of human rights
possesses tremendous emancipatory potential when deployed by grassroots
environmental justice movements to advocate for a more equitable and
sustainable society. On the other hand, human rights law and institutions are
embedded in power relations that replicate colonial discourses (such as the
savior-savage narrative) and enable Northern states and transnational
corporations to evade responsibility for their abuse of nature and of vulnerable
states and peoples.
In order to realize the emancipatory potential of
environmental human rights, scholars and practitioners should develop a nonEurocentric account of the human rights project, amplify the voices of grassroots
environmental justice activists to influence the interpretation of environmental
human rights law, and develop legal theories that challenge the systemic
human rights violations of the global economic order rather than merely
ameliorating its most egregious manifestations. Environmental human rights
litigation must target not only Southern states, but also the Northern states and
TNCs that wield enormous power over the policies and practices of Southern
governments. Human rights law must recognize and vigorously enforce
collective human rights, the rights of nature, and the rights of future
generations. It must evolve in response to the needs and aspirations of
grassroots social justice movements, and incorporate local and indigenous
concepts of human dignity. In the words of Upendra Baxi:
The summons for the destruction of ‘narrative monopolies’ in
human rights theory and practice is of enormous importance, as
it enables us to recognize that the authorship of human rights
rests with communities in struggle against illegitimate power
formations and the politics of cruelty. The local, not the global,
it needs to be emphasized, remains the crucial site of struggle for
the enunciation, implementation, and enjoyment and exercise of
human rights.
The pre-history of almost every global
institutionalization of human rights is furnished everywhere by
the local.237
Human rights law is by no means a panacea for the world’s environmental
ills, but it is an important tool in a broader campaign for global environmental
justice that complements but does not replace domestic environmental
regulation, the negotiation and implementation of environmental treaties, and

236. See NEIL STAMMERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT 102-30 (2009).
237. BAXI, supra note 37, at 184-85.
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extra-legal popular mobilization for a more just, humane, and ecologically
sustainable economic order.
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